

Ibn Sinā's Psychology: The Substantiation of Soul Values in Islamic Education

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Abstract

The soul is one of the major psychological topics which has been explored by Muslim scholars. Among them was Ibn Sinā, a Muslim philosopher, who emphasized the study of the human soul. His mental conception of the soul was so well-developed that it received much attention and appreciation from later Islamic philosophers such as al-Ghazālī, Fakhrudin al-Rāzi, Ibn Rushd and Western scholars. This article explores Ibn Sinā's concept of the soul and its substance in Islamic education. The methodology employed is a literature review together with qualitative research using exploratory, descriptive, and analytical approaches. Ibn Sinā argued that the soul is a living spiritual substance inspiring the body and forms the infrastructure for acquiring knowledge and transforming it in real life. In contrast to the body, the soul is immaterial and eternal. Islamic education cannot be separated from the psychological elements elucidated by Ibn Sinā and must incorporate relevant psychological aspects in order to fully develop the potential of students towards becoming exemplary human beings (*insān kāmil*).

Keywords: Ibn Sina's Psychology, Concept of Soul, Islamic Education

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1. INTRODUCTION

The discourse on the soul is among the major academic topics addressed by Muslim scholars. Before the advent of Islam, Greek philosophers such as Antagoras, Socrates, Aristotle, Plato, and others after them delved deeply into the subject. However, the soul has not been widely studied in the context of religion as explained by Moharir (2017), Prabhupāda (1970), and Vartak (1995). Western scholars still assume the soul as an abstract, complex, material, and illogical concept. Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), a Western scholar, made a fatal argument by assuming that the soul is the product of physical growth (Vos, 1968). From the Islamic perspective, human beings are created from and consist of the elements of body and soul (lahiriyah-batiniah).

In Islam, the study of body and soul has been discussed by *ulama* (religious leaders), philosophers, and Muslim scholars, such as al-Kindi and al-Farābi. They elaborated on the concept of the soul as adopted and adapted from the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato. For them, the dimensions of the soul (metaphysical) transcend physical or bodily elements (Arroisi & Da'i, 2019; Najati, 1993). Although the relationship between soul and body is inherent and intertwined, the soul has a more hegemonic role (Sina, 1959; Hasse, 2000). A systematic study of the soul can be found in the work of Ibn Sinā (Nasr, 1964; Sharif, 1983) who was one of the many Muslim philosophers concerned with the aspects of psychology. The theory of soul (*nafs*) that he developed received much attention and appreciation from later Muslim philosophers, such as al-Ghazālī, Fakhrudin al-Rāzi, Ibn Rushd, and Western scholars (Reza, 2014).

In *Ahwal al-Nafs*, Ibn Sinā stated that the soul is a spiritual substance that inspires the body to live and becomes a tool for acquiring science and theological knowledge (Sina, 1952). The

hybridization process of the two resulted in the great goal of Islamic education, which is the effort to develop the full potential of individuals in becoming ideal human beings through physical, intellectual, and character maturity (Sina & ibn‘Ali, 1906). In brief, education should aim to develop the maximum potential of students in the provision of social life and *khalifah fil ardh*. As such, Ibn Sinā seems to base his views on *insān kāmil* (perfect human) rather than *insan juz’i* (partial human).

This article presents soul-related values which are of relevance to substantive values. The few studies that focus on this theme do not, or only link them partly, to Islamic education or merely examine Ibn Sinā’s thoughts on education without relating them to the values of the soul (Reza, 2014). Through library research and employing a qualitative-descriptive approach, this article explores the concept of the soul from Ibn Sinā’s perspective and its substantiation in Islamic education.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Ibn Sinā was a Muslim philosopher who integrated the discourse and thoughts of classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle in his works on psychology (Madkur, 1968). He was the most authoritative figure to explain psychology (Corbin, 2014; Germann, 2012). Though Ibn Sinā’s opinions were significantly influenced by al-Farabi, he explored the concepts in greater depth, precision, and detail than his predecessors (Ustman Najati, 2002).

His magnum opus, *al-Qanun fi al-Tibb* (The Canon of Medicine), which consists of five volumes, offers a remarkably comprehensive explanation of all medical studies (psychology, psychiatry, and neurology). The psychological studies in *al-Qanun* discussed and analyzed the essence of the human soul, mind, psychic flow, intellect, dreams, aspirations, and human desires as well as other major aspects of psychology (Cerić & Mehić-Basara, 1997). His masterpieces have been a major source of Islamic medicine and Western scholarship to this day. Ibn Sinā’s views on the relationship between the soul and the body are found in *al-Shifa*. Of his many works, his second book is considered to contain the longest description on issues related to the soul. The remainder, comprising brief and concise descriptions, are found in his other work, *al-Najah*, which is written scientifically and meaningfully (Sina, 1988).

Despite his remarkable achievements as noted above, Ibn Sinā continued to advance his ideas in *al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat* (Remarks and Admonitions) and *al-Qasida al-‘Ainiyya* (Poem on The Soul) where he wrote not less than 20 pages discussing the earlier philosophers’ thoughts on psychological issues and characteristics (Sina, 2009). Furthermore, he also gave advice on Aristotle’s work, *De Anima*, which is still in manuscript form (makhtuthat) (Sina & Ali, 1960). On the “orders” of the ruler, namely Governor Nuh bin Mansur al-Samani, he published several treatises on the power of the soul and issues related to the rationalization of the soul and its matters (Madkur, 1968). Ibn Sinā produced many other works (Gohlman, 1986) but the five essays described above are the most important in psychology-related discussions.

3. OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this article is to explore the concept of the soul from Ibn Sinā’s perspective and its substantiation in Islamic education.

4. METHODOLOGY

A review of the literature and a qualitative-descriptive approach is used as the methodology for this article. It involves a literature review complemented with a comparative analysis based on data from the works of Ibn Sinā such as *al-Qanun fi al-Tibb* (Sina, 2005), *Ahwal al-Nafs: Risalah fi Nafs wa Baqa’i hawa Ma’adiha* (Sina, 1952), *al-Shifa al-Tabi’iyyat al-Nafs* (Sina, 1988), *al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat* (Inati, 2019; Sina & Ali, 1960), *al-Siyasah fi al-Tarbiyah* (Sina & ibn‘Ali, 1906), etc. This article focuses on the works of Ibn Sinā in relation to the concepts of psychological soul values and

their substantiation in Islamic education.

5. FINDINGS

5.1 Definition and Nature of the Soul

Linguistically, the word soul comes from the Arabic word *nafs*, which means soul or self (Warson, 1997). Western literature discusses it as soul or self (Hendrik, 2009). The soul, in religion and philosophy, is defined as a human immaterial entity identified by the mind or self. In theology, the soul is believed to remain alive and eternal after death and the creator of the soul is God (Soul | Religion and Philosophy | Britannica, n.d.). The word “self” encapsulates the meaning of the two main elements in humans, namely the body and soul (Al-Attas, 1966).

Ibn Manzur said that the term *nafs* (soul) has several equivalent words including spirit, reason, lust, blood flow, exhaled air (breath), and something soft. Therefore, the soul is a soft thing that has an important role in the body (essence) and cannot be felt (Ibn Manzūr, 2003). Some equivalent terms include *ruh* (spirit) and *'aql* (mind). Regarding the two, Ibn Sinā did not distinguish between them, nor did al-Ghazali and Ibn Hazm (Al-Ghazali, 1975; Hazm, 1986). However, Ibn Sinā stated that the *nafs* and the spirit are two levels of a single entity called the *nafs*. In transcendental gradation, it is pure, holy, and in the next level, which is phenomenal, it incarnates as a body and then animates and moves it. Ibn Sinā classified the study of the *nafs* in the first level as part of metaphysics, while in the second level or the phenomenal, *nafs* is part of the natural sciences (Sharif, 1983).

Specifically, Ibn Sinā stated that the soul (*nafs*) is the perfection of the body at the initial stage (*al-awwal al-kamal li jism*) (Druart, 2000; Sina, 1988), and is the entry point for moving the human body (Najati, 1993). Meanwhile, the body is the second perfection as a tool that serves to carry out activities, and both (body and soul) are intertwined and inherent in human identity. Although both are diametrically different in substance, their roles are complementary. The terminology provided by Ibn Sinā is exactly that of Aristotle, al-Kindi, and al-Farābi, and the Muslim and Western philosophers after him (Najati, 1993). Furthermore, Ibn Sinā revealed that the soul can be explained in terms of three elements, namely vegetable, animal and human. The vegetable soul is seen from birth, growth, and eating while the animal soul can be viewed from the aspect of knowledge, sexual and worldly desires, and partial things (*juz'i*). The human soul is seen from knowledge that is holistic and universal (*kulli*) (Jamali et al., 2019).

Perfection, as quoted earlier, for Ibn Sinā was not in the sense of a form (*surah* or *maddah*) or materials as assumed by Aristotle but rather *jauhar* (substance) (Sina, 1952). Ibn Sinā did not deny that the *surah* is the starting point for the perfection of the body, but that does not mean that all perfection is a *surah*. He equates it with the president as the ideal actualization of the perfection of the state's existence, but he is not a *surah* of the state (Sina, 1988). Finally, the soul (*nafs*) is not in the form of a body (*maddah* or material) but is an independent substance (*jauhar qaimun bi dhatih*) that is immaterial (Sina, 1938a).

The term soul as the “initial perfection of the body” does not actually accommodate the definition of the nature of the soul itself. “The soul is different from the body,” said Ibn Sinā (Daudy, 1992). The formless soul (immaterial), which does not reside in or directly control the body, is called *aql al-fa'al* (driving mind). On the other hand, if it resides and controls the body directly, it is called *nafs* (soul) (Glasse, 1989, 1999). Therefore, a common thread can be drawn that the soul (*nafs*) according to Ibn Sinā is the active mind in the body (Amien, 1983). In fact, the conclusions he drew were preceded by Plato (Hommel, 2019; Jones, 2013; Long, 1973) and al-Farabi of the Muslim philosophers (Al-Farabi, 1996; López-Farjeat, 2016).

In the anatomical structure of the psyche, Ibn Sinā posited four views to explain the nature of the soul in human life. First, the soul is able to know the object of thought (*ma'qulat*) which the body cannot (Arroisi & Da'i, 2019). This is due to the fact that the body is material, while the object

of thought is immaterial and contained in the imagination of the mind. It is not inherent, so that it cannot be physically read. Second, the soul is able to grasp abstract issues (kulli) and its dhatiah does not require reason. This of course contradicts the senses that are only physically able to read. In addition, the essence of the soul has its own mechanism for deliberating matters that are hissi (sensory).

Third, the soul is eternal. When the human body merges with the ground or dies, the soul remains alive. It is not degraded even when tired. Instead, the soul undergoes a process of deliberation to facilitate its path towards ‘aql fa’al (the driving mind), namely Allah the Almighty (Amien, 1983). Fourth, the older the human soul, the more mature it is. It should be stressed that the word “soul” meant here is that which resides in the body and not in its spirit (Allah the Almighty). For example, if a person's physical age increases, tiredness sets in and strength begins to decrease in both reasoning and physical capabilities. However, this does not apply to the soul; instead, it matures spiritually and socially (Sina, 1938b).

These are some of the arguments presented by Ibn Sinā regarding the nature of the soul as an independent and eternal spiritual substance. It has its own mechanism that is different from the human body. The soul is metaphysical and immaterial. This view later became an important contribution and a guide to subsequent philosophers.

5.2 The Existence of Soul

Everything needs actualization to exist, and the soul is no exception. In fact, Allah SWT introduces Himself as the God Almighty to prove that He exists and is worshiped by human beings. So it is with the human soul. It is a sacred spiritual substance which Ibn Sinā felt was important enough to require at least four conditions for it to exist (‘Abd al-Dāyīm Abū al-‘Aṭā al-Baqarī Anṣārī, 1948; Rayyan, 1967).

The first is natural psychology which is based on the phenomenon of motion and actualization. Ibn Sinā divided this into two parts, namely coercive motion (qasriyyah) and volitional motion (iradiyyah), both of which do not originate from the body. The mechanisms of the two are also different. Coercive motion occurs due to the external factors that drive it, while volitional motion occurs due to natural laws (sunnatullah). This can be compared to a rock falling from the top to the bottom due to natural gravity, and can occur in reverse, from bottom to top, or to float, depending on the laws of nature. The motion is not automatic or just happens, but is due to a “special driver” that operates on it in a way that is distinct from the material elements of the body (Daudy, 1992; Fakhry, 1971; Sina, n.d.).

The second factor is continuity (istimrar). According to Ibn Sinā, the soul is different from the body. The body is inseparable from the material elements that undergo dynamic processes such as change, shifts, maturation, aging, death, life, and so on. Therefore, humans need to eat, drink, and marry to “replace and regenerate” what is lost from the body. Thus, you are different from your body or physical self. This is the authoritative proposition to open our invisible door. The essence of the soul is supernatural which is physically inaccessible (hissi) (Sina, 2009). From the above it is clear that Ibn Sinā considered the soul as different from the body. The body will continue to experience dynamic processes, either increasing or decreasing, but the soul remains even as the body is damaged or dies.

The third proposition is that of the floating man. This proposition by Ibn Sinā is an extremely interesting one due to the breadth and power of the imagination involved. Floating man is an objective and imaginative thought-based experiment premised on experimentation beyond experimental reason. In a sense, the term “floating man” requires a metaphysical modality. In the illustration, a perceptually floating human being can be depicted as someone capable of floating in the air, walking on water, disappearing in the blink of an eye like the speed of angels, jinns, demons, and spirits (Alwishah, 2013; Hertogh, 2013). Hasse (2000) objected to such thinking, claiming it was impossible for humans to fly. Later, he defined floating humans as evidence of soul substantiality or

incorporeality or words such as “pure spiritual entity” in the above-mentioned reconstruction. According to him, this argument is a mere fabrication (Hasse, 2000). However, the following narration of Ibn Sinā should be noted:

If a person is created as a set that is in perfect shape and form and he is “sitting” in the air (empty air), no one will touch him, so that he does not feel anything. He is separated from his body, not touching each other. In this context, he believes that his form still exists even though he cannot feel and know the slices of his limbs or outside of himself. If in this state, he can imagine that there are hands or other limbs, then he cannot imagine a part of himself and the conditions of his existence. Therefore, the form of the soul is different from the form of the body, even the body and that the person do not know and feel it. (Al-Fakhuri & Al-Jar, 1987)

Hasse called what Ibn Sinā made a form of acute fatalism. Ibn Sinā's argument of floating man was more about sacred spiritual substance aspects that are not tied to the physical aspects definitively - he can feel and know in the eyes of the soul, not the body.

The fourth proposition is related to self-centeredness and the assimilation of psychological symptoms. This proposition which makes clear Descartes's “cogito, ergo sum” (I think therefore I exist) implies the existence of the human soul and not its physical aspect or context. Meanwhile, the postulate of the assimilation of psychological symptoms is that human feelings and activities are varied and can be contradictory, confrontational, or accommodating, such as sad-happy, love-hate, good-bad, all of which can occur within oneself. However, this can only happen if there is a determining element binding the whole (*ribat yajma' bainaha kullaha*), namely the soul (*nafs*) (Ghallâb, 1966; Reza, 2014). If this element does not exist, perhaps humans would rage at each other relentlessly.

5.3 Relationship between the Soul and Body

The views of Ibn Sinā on the relationship of the soul with the body are fairly similar to Aristotle's. The soul can never reach its culmination point without being supported by the body (Madkour & Islam, 1993). It is the source of life, potential, regulator and organizer for the body. Ibn Sinā compared this to the captain or pilot who, upon entering a ship or aircraft, immediately becomes the controller and propulsion of the entire vessel. The absence of soul means no life for the body. Material in the form of a body is an absolute prerequisite for the beginning of a soul's existence; the soul needs a place to reside, and that place is the human body. On condition that thinking activity is a function that is “only” owned by the soul, then that function will not work perfectly without the help of the senses (body) or brain through its potentials (Sina, 1938a, 1988).

In other words, Ibn Sinā did not completely negate Aristotle's view of the soul. Aristotle viewed the soul as substance (existence) and a form that is closely related to the body. However, Ibn Sinā did not blindly accept, but slightly corrected, the relationship in question - as in the views of other Muslim philosophers - that there is an essential relationship that has implications for the “temporary” soul. Thus, when the physical body ceases to exist (dies), the soul will die too. Furthermore, Ibn Sinā argued that the physicality of a sick person can be healed by the power of *irada*. This means that mental strength is also a determinant of physical health; hence when the human subconscious mind nurtures itself daily with “I must be healthy” sentiments, then the body too will definitely be healthy. This is due to the positive energy that is transformed into the physical body (Avicenna & Rahman, 1952; Druart, 2000; Rahman, 1953, 1959).

Moreover, Ibn Sinā also strengthened the previous argument about the proof of equality (*al-burhan al-mushabbihah*) that the human soul is categorized into the realm of reason (*al-'aql al-fa'al*) which is immaterial and *al-nufus al-falakiyyah* because the mind's realm is eternal and, as such, everything equating to it is eternal as His eternity (Sina, 1938b). Ibn Sinā's argument on the immortality of the soul can be explored in *Tahafut al-Falasifah* in which al-Ghazālī (1888) states, “it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed at the same time as the body is destroyed. The body is actually not a place of the soul, but a temporary stopover.” Furthermore, the body is the tool used by

the soul and all the potential contained in the body. Therefore, the destruction of the tool does not necessitate the destruction of the person who uses it, unless it has been dominated by the animalistic spirit and lust alone.

However, this does not mean that the soul is eternal but that its survival depends on Allah's will as well. As quoted in His words in Surah al-Fajr [89: 27-30], "O reassured soul, return to your Lord, well-pleased and pleasing [to him]. And enter among My [righteous] servants. And enter My Paradise."

5.4 Substantiation of Soul Values in Islamic Education

For Ibn Sinā, educating human beings is of fundamental importance. According to him, Islamic education should seek to develop all the potential of individuals towards achieving perfect physical, psychological, intellectual, and moral development (Prasetia, 2020; Prasetia & Najiyah, 2021).

Mofrad (1999) believes that Ibn Sinā developed Aristotle's concept within the Islamic framework stating that "Ibn Sinā agreed with the Greek philosophers that intellectual development is the true goal of all mankind. Aristotle also believed that practical wisdom or common sense was the best guide to action. Kindness must be inculcated by habituation, and theoretical education must be carried out with strong moral commitment. To acquire knowledge means to understand the essence of things that are real, universal, and inevitable" (Salleh & Embong, 2017; Zibakalam-Mofrad, 1999).

If we look at some of Ibn Sinā's opinions on the purpose of education and integrate them with one another, it seems that he had a hierarchical-structural view. It shows that Ibn Sinā had a universal and not a facultative view of education. Hence, it has consequences for the development of non-dichotomous scholarship as attributed by Western scholars. Interestingly, Ibn Sinā – as well as philosophers before and after him – were able to translate the goals of Islamic education both terminologically and operationally. This was because Ibn Sinā and Muslim philosophers shared the same thought framework of what constituted *insān kāmil* (perfect human), individuals who positively and comprehensively nurture and develop their potentials towards the goal of achieving the status of *insān kāmil*.

Meanwhile, the substantiation of soul values in Islamic education is divided into several parts, including curriculum and methods. For curriculum, Ibn Sinā divided it into the following four aspects.

First, curriculum preparation is based on the psychological aspects of students. Children should be taught the Qur'an at an early age through *talqin* (orally). At the same time, it is necessary to teach them literacy and the basics of religious and moral education (Al-Abrasyi, 1975). For teenagers, the teaching process should emphasize on deepening the material aspects according to their talents and interests. It means that there is specialization in certain scientific fields. Second, the curriculum should be pragmatic-functional or have concrete utility values in accordance with the needs of the market (marketing oriented) without abandoning spiritual-transcendental values.

Third, curriculum design must also be based on the teachings of Islamic orthodoxy namely the Al-Quran and al-Hadith in order to generate outputs and outcomes that are *salih* and *akram*. Fourth, curriculum styles should be integral and contextual based. The integral aspects mentioned are the absence of scientific dichotomies, all of which are inherent and correlate with each other. Likewise, in designing contextual and learning content the social contexts of the local community should not be neglected. Ibn Sinā lived in a place which was well-known for its culture of art and poetry, and, as such, he also paid serious attention to this.

In addition, in *al-Siyasah fi al-Tarbiyah* which explored issues of ethics, economics, household procedures, and family, Ibn Sinā discussed the importance of the involvement of both parents in the formation of a child's character (Afnan, 2009; Rosenthal, 1962; Sina & ibn'Ali, 1906).

The family is the first source of human education. Ibn Sinā also emphasized the importance of selecting a good name for the child, something that was shared by Muhyiddin Abu Zakariya al-Nawawi (1980) in quoting the hadith of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) that, “Verily all of you will be called on the Day of Resurrection by your names and the names of your fathers. Therefore, beautify your names.”

This hadith became the basis for Ibn Sinā to give a good name to his child, as there are certain psychological benefits and implications. A good name certainly brings its own blessings (blessing in disguise) for its owner. Therefore, Islam places great emphasis on choosing a good name. For Ibn Sinā, one of the duties of parents to children is to give them a good name and take good care of them (Nashir, 1977).

Moreover, the substantiation of the second soul value is contained in the method of Islamic education as proposed by Ibn Sinā based on the following four characteristics. First, the selection and application of methods must be relevant to the characteristics of the field of study, and the chosen method must not be wrong. A good method is described as one that suits the characteristics of the students and the field of study. Second, the implementation of the method must take into account the psychological aspects of students; five- and fifteen-year-old students are certainly different from each other, and so forth. Therefore, educators must be well-versed in both the practical and theoretical levels. Third, the method must be flexible or contextually substantive. Fourth, the accuracy of selecting and applying a method remains relevant to the demands of the times. Therefore, Sayyidina Ali’s ideas on educating children according to their age was strongly advocated by Ibn Sinā because children are raised in their particular age in contrast to the parents’ era. Ibn Sinā’s views on this matter show his sensitivity, seriousness, and expertise in understanding the concept of education both theoretically and practically, thus revealing his futuristic thinking.

Furthermore, the third substantiation relates to the soul in the context of Islamic education. First, the vegetative soul of man. This soul is translated through the power of nutrition or of eating. In his magnum opus, *al-Tabikh* (The Book of Dishes) Ibn Sayyar al-Warraaq, a culinary expert from Baghdad (A. M. al M. al-Warraaq, n.d.; I. S. al-Warraaq, 1987; Nasrallah et al., 2007), stated that every dish made must adhere to healthy and halal criteria. He also brings together culinary and science. Ibn Sayyar also proclaimed that people should pay attention to the advice and recommendations of nutritionists and health experts to ensure that the food served is highly nutritious. In addition to the culinary aspects, Ibn Sayyar also highlighted the importance of etiquette (*adab*) or setting of meals at the dining table, preparing meals, and the kitchen utensils used (I. S. al-Warraaq, 1987).

Thus, it is clear that Islamic education cannot be separated from the issue of food. Good and healthy food will produce a healthy body, both in religion and in the construction of thought. In the language of religion, health is interpreted as *thayyib* which is nutritious, does not harm the body and obtained in a halal way. In addition, eating etiquette is also important, such as not criticizing bad food, disposing it carelessly due to excessive intake, and so on.

Second, the animal soul or reproductive faculty. The issue of reproduction is not only limited to human biological and psychological domains but also extends to the field of theology. This must be realized by educators so that students do not mistakenly “use” their reproductive organs. Lust is among the intrinsic traits of humans, but it must be exercised based on Islamic guidance. Otherwise, humans will live as animals, even more despicable than the animal itself. This power is of extreme importance for human regeneration and the multiplication of human offspring. Therefore, it also concerns the question of selecting a virtuous life partner having the characteristics prescribed by the Prophet, in terms of beauty, wealth, lineage, and religion. For the last mention, Islam is extremely privileged for not denying the other three elements. Javanese philosophy also mentions this, using terms like *bibit*, *bobot*, and *bebet* (origin, quality, and rank).

Third, is growth power. Growth is a necessity for living things and humans are no exception. In the context of Islamic education, the development and growth of students is also a major consideration in educating them. For example, students should not be forced to learn using visual methods while they tend to use audio, and vice versa. Another example, is to not allow small mistakes to be made over a long period of time, such as drinking with the left hand, or taking money/goods even at home without prior permission. Such negative acts will affect the character of children in the future. Repetitive actions will develop into habits, and habits will become characteristics.

Fourth, thinking power. Good education is defined as having the ability to develop and optimize human potential, one of which is the thinking ability of students. The ability of the mind to comprehend truth is not meant as a weakness, but this is precisely where the mind's need for higher knowledge lies. This is due to the influence of the senses in being able to see material objects while the mind is only able to comprehend limited concepts of knowledge. Sensory abilities such as auditory, vision, taste, touch, and smell are extremely useful for humans and, together with the ability to store memories, remember, fantasize, imagine, and be creative, should be properly developed in order to achieve a situation of *insān kāmil* (perfect human) (Ismunanto, 2019).

Fifth, movement power. After the mind, comes the power of movement. The concept of knowledge altered by the mind will produce behaviour, and that requires movement. In the context of Islamic education, this power plays an important role in optimizing the potential of students, such as giving and appreciating their inclination to move, practice movements from easy to difficult, strengthening muscles, and sharpening nerve sharpness, and so forth, and including lust and anger which must be managed properly.

Sixth, the practical and theoretical mind. In simple terms they are referred to as IQ (intelligence quotient), EQ (emotional quotient), and SQ (spiritual quotient). This is what distinguishes humans from other living things. A good education is not only for training analytical thinking skills, but also to reflect and train moral judgements that are essential for the progress and happiness of students. Too much theory and analysis is also not good, and just as when rational abilities do not develop, it creates a deficiency in students. On the other hand, being too pragmatic or practical is also not good, as students live and develop not only at the practical level, but also at the theoretical level. Logical arguments and rationalizations must also support all actions that are performed. Therefore, education has a duty and role in the context of human complement as *ahsanu taqwim*.

Thus, Ibn Sinā's concept of Islamic education was extremely advanced and has contributed significantly to Islamic as well as world civilization. Despite the passing of almost a millennium, his thoughts in various disciplines of knowledge, especially psychology, soul, and Islamic education remain extremely relevant and contextual for education today.

6. CONCLUSION

The concept of psychology developed by Ibn Sinā deserves extraordinary appreciation. Although Western scientists regard the soul as something abstract, Ibn Sinā appears as one of the great Muslim scientists who uncovered psychology based on Islamic values. Ibn Sinā believed that the soul (*nafs*) is the perfection of the body at the initial stage (*al-awwal al-kamal li jism*). It is the entrance to move the human body. Meanwhile, the body, as the second perfection, is a tool that functions to carry out activities. Both body and soul are intertwined and inherent in human identity. Although the two differ diametrically in substance, their roles are complementary. The soul is eternal and will not decay along with the human body.

The human soul has a variety of potentials that can be developed to create a perfect human (*insān kāmil*) in line with the goal of Islamic education espoused by Ibn Sinā. Without such potentials, any series of educational processes that take place will not be effective. Potential souls

are vegetable, animal, and human souls, and these three, as noted in al-Najah, contribute significantly to the physical, intellectual, and psychological development and growth of humans. Meanwhile, the substantiation of soul values in Islamic education can be divided into several parts, including curriculum and methods.

In terms of curriculum and methods, Ibn Sinā underlined the importance of developing a curriculum based on the psychological aspects of students. In addition, the selection and application of methods must be relevant to the characteristics of the field of study, and such methods should be robust, relevant, and efficacious in meeting the desired objectives. A good method should be appropriate to the characteristics of students and the field of study, and its implementation should take into consideration the psychological aspects of students. Ibn Sinā's arguments and postulates about the concept of the soul are actually the result of a mixture of Plato, al-Farābi, and the idea of an *insān kāmil* (perfect human).

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